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STEPHEN FRERICHS* and K. WILLIAM EASTER**

Regulation of Interbasin Transfers
and Consumptive Uses from the
Great Lakes***
ABSTRACT
The Great Lakes were an open access resource with respect to consumptive water use, priorto the promulgationof the Great Lakes Charter
and the Water Resource Development Act of 1986. Concern about the
open access nature of the lakes was sparkedby the Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas Supreme Court Decision, which limited states' power to
prevent water transfers. The resulting nonbinding Great Lakes Charter
recommends a set of management rules enforced through state water
permits. However, not all GreatLakes States have implemented the Charter
Provisions, and damages associated with lake water withdrawals are
generally not accountedfor by the permits. Because the charter recommends management by a standard(permits enforce some standard)without setting the standard, evolution towards a basin wide transferable
permit system is recommended. Transferable permits would require the
definition of a standard but would result in a cost effective means of
managing the lakes.
INTRODUCTION
Concern for protecting the Great Lakes Basin from unwanted interbasin
transfers was the impetus behind the Great Lakes Charter of 1985,' and
the Water Resource Development Act of 1986.2 Both create means to
regulate Great Lakes Basin water diversions and consumptive uses. The
charter establishes rules of access and conduct between states/provinces
for consumptive uses and new or increased diversions.' The Water Re*Formerly Research Assistant. University of Minnesota. Currently with the Economic Research
Service, Washington, D.C.
.*Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
***This work is the result of research sponsored by the Minnesota Sea Grant College Program,
supported by the NOAA Office at Sea Grant. Department of Commerce, under Grant No. NA86AAD-SG112. The U.S. government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for government
purposes, not withstanding any copyright notation that may appear hereon.
i. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Final Report and Recommendations, Great Lakes Govenmors' Task Force on Water Diversion and Great Lakes Institutions (Jan. 1985) (hereinafter Council
of Great Lakes Governorsi.
2. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082, Nov. 17,
1986 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (Supp. V 1987).
3. Task Force on Water Diversion and Great Lakes Institutions. Council of Great Lakes Governors.
Great Lakes Governors' Task Force on Water Diversion and Great Lakes Institutions (1985) [hereinafter Task Forcel.
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source Development Act of 1986 assures the Great Lakes states that U.S.
federal authority for an interbasin diversion out of the Great Lakes Basin
will not be granted without the Great Lakes states' approval."
Historically, water in the Great Lakes has been an open access, free
good. However, a sluggish regional economy and a perception of growing
demand for Great Lakes water, synergized with recent judicial decisions
affecting the legality of interstate water transfers, have acted as a catalyst
to encourage management of the Great Lakes.' A political climate has
been created among the Great Lakes states and provinces for cooperatively
managing the Great Lakes, where management implies the desire to
regulate and restrict access to Great Lakes water."
This article first describes the institutional constraints imposed on the
states by the 1982 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas Supreme Court
decision and its implications for Great Lakes water management. This is
followed by a brief overview of the goals and management decisions
embodied in the Great Lakes Charter. The resulting regulatory program
.is then evaluated employing simple efficiency and equity criteria to determine whether management goals will be attained. Finally, based on
the evaluation of the current management scheme, recommendations are
made for a transferable property right system.
INTERSTATE WATER MANAGEMENT
Historically, states have exercised state police power to prohibit or
regulate interstate water transfers." However, recent judicial decisions
have challenged this practice. The Supreme Court ruled in Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas' that groundwater is an article of commerce
and subject to the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. As a result,
Nebraska could not forbid the transfer of groundwater across its state
line. The Sporhase decision considered protection of the health and welfare of a state's citizenry an appropriate purpose to prohibit interstate
transfers of water, but protection solely for economic purposes was not
deemed sufficient.' Upholding and reinforcing the Sporhasedecision, the
1983 El Paso v. New Mexico decision struck down a New Mexico
4. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20.
5. Donahue, Bixby & Siebert, Great Lakes Diversion and Consumptive Use: The Issue in Perspective, 18 Case W. Res. J. lat. L. 19, 21 (1986).
6. The eight Great Lakes states are: Illinois. Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania. and Wisconsin. The Canadian provinces are Quebec and Ontario.
7. Tarlock. Intra and Interstate Usage of Great Lakes Water: ALegal Overview, 18 Case W. Res.
J. [nt. L. 67, 79 (1986).
8. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
9. Id. See also. Massey, Great Lakes Water Diversion: Legal Issues (June 10-12, 1985) (paper
presented to Water Resources Planning and Managemnt Division Conference, Buffalo, NY).
10. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
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prohibition of water exports. Thus, any attempt by states to legislatively

embargo interstate water transfers strictly for economic reasons will likely
be held in conflict with the U.S. commerce clause.
The Sporhase decision applied four guidelines to evaluate the constitutionality of a state statute that restricts interstate groundwater transfers."
They are: 1)the statute must have a legitimate local purpose, 2) the statute
must regulate intra- and interstate diversions "even-handedly," 3) local
benefits must exceed the costs imposed on interstate commerce and, 4)
no less discriminating alternative against interstate commerce should exist. 2 For the Great Lakes, the "even-handedness" principle plays a crucial
role in any attempt to restrict transfers out of the Great Lakes Basin. The
principle implies that interbasin transfers within a riparian state must be
treated the same as interbasin transfers to non-riparian states.'"
Decisions in Sporhase do allow the opportunity for a state to protect
against unwanted diversions through legislative management. To unilaterally protect against undesired withdrawals, states. can enact statewide
water management programs that make preservation of state waters an
integral part of the water management program.' 4 To achieve this, a state
must:
I) develop a comprehensive water allocation plan for a reasonable
time period (this can be done under the state's police power);
2) link applications for all new major water uses to allocation priorities established in the plan; and,
3) use the state's police power to deny any water use allocations
which are not consistent with the plan.'"

A state can then deny a present water use application to reserve the water
for future needs.' 6 This form of legislative management requires the
establishment of a state water planning authority.
THE GREAT LAKES BASIN

Hydrologically, the Great Lakes are composed of five lakes: Superior,
Michigan, Huron, Erie, and Ontario. Large by any standard, the lakes
have relatively small outflows. The small outflows combine with vast
surface areas and large retention capacities to ameliorate short term lake
level fluctuations (on average one to two feet per year).' 7 Most lake level
It.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
to the

UC).

Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
Massey, supra note 9, at 6.
None of the Great Lakes states is completely within the basin, although Michigan is close.
Tarlock, supra note 7. at 106.
Id.
Id.
International Joint Commission. Great Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses, A Report
Governments of the United States and Canada under the 1977 Reference (1985) (hereinafter
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fluctuations occur naturally. Only two of the lakes have their outflows
regulated: Lake Superior at Sault St. Marie and Lake Ontario at the Moses
Saunders Power Dam. Other direct lake level influences occur in the form
of consumptive uses and diversions."'
Currently, five diversions affect the Great Lakes Basin: two flow into
Lake Superior from the James Bay River Basin at Long Lake and Ogoki,
Canada; one flows out of Lake Michigan at Chicago down the Chicago
River and eventually into the Mississippi River; another, the Welland
Canal, diverts water around Niagara Falls from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario;
and the final diversion, the New York State Barge Canal, is an intrabasin
diversion.
Consumptive uses, unlike diversions, tend to be small and not easily
identifiable. They include water for manufacturing, irrigation, mining,
and municipal purposes. 9 Impacts on lake levels by individual consumptive uses are small, but when considered cumulatively, they are
equivalent to a large scale diversion out of the basin.
Prior to the signing of the Great Lakes Charter, four of the eight Great
Lakes states had established individual, state access rules for diversions
out of the Great Lakes. Minnesota regulated any surface water appropriation in excess of 10,000 gallons per day (gpd) or 1,000,000 gallons
per year (gpy) through its statewide water permitting system.' The permits are required for any groundwater or surface water appropriation in
excess of these trigger levels. Indiana had a water embargo law prohibiting
diversion of Great Lakes water out of the basin, unless the diversion was
approved by the governors of each Great Lakes state. 2' Ohio required a
permit for any water diversion in excess of 100,000 gpd out of Lake
Erie."-2 Illinois regulates the Chicago Diversion, by Supreme Court decree;
at 3200 cubic feet per second (cfs).23 A permit and conservation program
exists to allocate the 3200 cfs among Illinois users. Illinois also prohibits
water diversions from Lake Michigan for use outside Illinois without
prior consent of all other Great Lakes states and the International Joint
Commission (IC).24
NEW RULES FOR COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT
With the institutional changes required by Sporhase, it was felt that
the individually fragmented state policies could not legally prohibit any
I. An interbasin transfer (diversion) is defined as a transfer of water from the Great Lakes Basin
into another river basin while a consumptive use is defined as that portion of water withdrawn or
withheld from the Great Lakes that is lost or otherwise not returned to the lakes. Id. at 5.
19. Task Force, supra note 3,at 2.
20. Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 105.41 (West 1977 and Cum. Supp. 1984).
21. Ind. Code Ann., § 13-2-1-9(b) (Bums Supp. 1984); Massey, supra note 9, at 23.
22. Ohio Rev. Code, § 1501.32 (Page Supp. 1984).
23. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967).
24. Level of Lake Michigan Act of 1984, ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 19 para. t19.2 (Supp. 1989).
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unwanted large scale transfers of water out of the Great Lakes.' Great
Lakes politicians, their states suffering through a recession in the early
1980s, decided to unite to protect their water resource for future economic
development. 26 Given the desire to preempt federal water management,
which was felt to favor the West, and the legislative constraints imposed
by Sporhase and El Paso, a uniform policy across all Great Lakes political
entities, including Canada, was needed.27 In 1985, the governors/premiers
agreed in principle to coordinate water quantity management among all
states/provinces across the basin by signing the Great Lakes Charter. The
charter's management objectives are:
to conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes ...to protect
and conserve ...the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem ... to provide

for cooperative programs and management of the water resources of
the Great Lakes Basin ...to make secure and protect present de-

velopments within the region; and to provide ...for future investment and development in the region. '"
The charter is based on five principles: 1) integrity of the Great Lakes
Basin, 2) cooperation among jurisdictions, 3) protection of the water
resources of the Great Lakes, 4) prior notice and consultation, and 5)
cooperative programs and practices. '9
The first principle, integrity of the Great Lakes Basin, recognizes politically that the Great Lakes Basin must be considered and managed as
a unified system. Allowing that the basin transcends political boundaries,
the second principle establishes the need for cooperation in management,
that is, common management rules. The third principle defines the attitude
or orientation of the management approach:
It is the intent of the signatory states and provinces that diversions
of Basin water resources will not be allowed if individually or cumulatively they would have any significant adverse impacts on lake
levels, in-basin uses, and the Great Lakes Ecosystem.'
The fourth and fifth principles establish how the first three are to be
accomplished. The Prior Notice and Consultation (PNC) rule requires
any state or province to consult and seek consent of all affected states
and provinces prior to approving any major new diversion or consumptive
use of Great Lakes water." The cooperative programs and practices (principle 5) involve the development of a common data base for basin-wide
25. Sugarman. Binding 7ies, Tying Bonds: International Optionsfor Constraints on Great Lakes
L. 239 (1986).
Diversions. Legal Overview, 18 Case W. Res. J. Int.

26. Donahue, Bixby & Siebert, supra note 5, at 21.
27. Id.
28. Council of Geat Lakes Governors. supra noat I. at 22.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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water use and the creation of a Water Resources Management Committee
(WRMC) to promulgate a water resources management program for the
Great Lakes. "
In February of 1987, the WRMC published its recommendation for
management. Data collection is to be organized by water use category
and aggregated by sub-basin." The committee found a wide variation
between states regarding actual data collected and the states' authority to
collect data. Few of the states/provinces collected water use data in all
nine categories recommended by the WRMC. A trigger level of 100,000
gpd in any 30 day average was set as a minimum sized water withdrawal
required for data collection.'
The WRMC also established guidelines for state participation in the
PNC process. Participation is premised on a state/province having the
authority: 1) to register any withdrawal in excess of 100,000 gpd, 2) to
regulate any withdrawal in excess of 2 million gpd in any 30 day period,
and 3) to notify all other affected states/provinces of a consumptive use
or diversion in excess of 5 million gpd in any 30 day period."
While few of the basin states had the capability or authority to register
or regulate any water withdrawal at these trigger levels prior to 1983,
both provinces did. In order to meet these stipulations, a state had to pass
enabling legislation. The intent of the charter's cosigners was for each
state/province to legislatively implement the PNC process, making prior
notification legally binding through each state/province legislature. "
However, even when legislatively required to notify and consult, the final
withdrawal decision remains with the proposing state/province, that is,
the compact is non-binding. Table I summarizes legislative changes for
the eight Great Lakes states as of August, 1989."
To date, both Canadian provinces and five U.S. states (Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin) meet all eligibility requirements
for the PNC process. Michigan may propose legislation in 1990 to require
reporting of Great Lakes water withdrawals, but no permitting process

will be advanced.-" Indiana had proposed legislation tabled in its 1989
32. Id. The WRMC is composed of representatives appointed by each governor and premier of
the Great Lakes states and provinces. The committee was charged with developing and implementing
procedures for water use data collection and for prior notice and consultation.
33. Categories are: public water supply, domestic self-supplied, irrigation, industrial, commercial
self-supplied, mining, agriculture, thermoelectric, and hydroelectric power. Water Resources Management Committee, Managing the Water of the Great Lakes Basin: A Report to the Governors and
Premiers of the Grea Lakes States and Provinces 2 (Feb. 1987).

34. Id. at 10.
35. Id.
36. Donahue, Bixby & Siebert, supra note 5, at 22.
37. Both Canadian provinces met all requirements prior to the charter.
38. Telephone interview with Ronald Van Till, Water Resource Analyst, Office of Water Resources,
Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Lansing (Dec. 6, 1989).
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state legislation session. The proposal included a procedure for implementing surface water permits for Great Lakes water.39 So far, Pennsylvania has not proposed any legislative action."
Concurrently with the state administrative efforts for basin management, basin state congressmen were proposing bills to protect basin interests from interstate diversions. Although language in the bills changed
to interbasin diversion, the end result was the Water Resource Development Act of 1986. The act prohibits any sized interbasin water diversion
from the Great Lakes, unless such diversion is approved by each Great
Lakes state governor."'
The goals and objectives of the charter and the act are different. The
charter seeks to regulate all water withdrawals out of the Great Lakes
within a specified size range, while the Public Law regulates diversions
of any size out of the basin.': The Public Law does make the charter's
non-binding principle of notification binding in the instance of diversions,
but not for consumptive uses. Also, the Public Law does not apply to
the Canadians nor does it establish a medium for cooperative management
such as the PNC process.
In summary, two legal decisions, Sporhase and El Paso, are the decisive
impetus behind the new management rules for the Great Lakes. The
rulings establish guidelines for legislative management of state water
resources. Of particular importance to Great Lakes management is the
"even-handedness principle" which requires all interbasin diversions to
be treated alike, whether intra- or interstate." In response to the new
institutional constraints, the Great Lakes Charter was developed, which
creates a cooperative forum to regulate aggregate water loss out of the
Great Lakes Basin resulting from large scale consumptive uses or diversions. The instrument .chosen to regulate water use was state water permits.
THE PERMIT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT

Any system of property rights for a resource will affect allocation and
use of the resource. Since state water permits establish property rights,
39. Telphone interview with James J. Heenstreit, Assistant Director. Division of Water, Indiana
Department of Natural Resources, Indianapolis (Dec. 5. 1989).
40. Telephone interview with Joseph K. Hoffman. Assistant Director. Bureau of Water Resource
Management. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resource. Harrisburg (June 16. 1987).
41. Water Resources Development Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-662. 100 Stat. 4082, (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 10 Supp. V 1987).
42. The term "diversion" was not defined in the bill.

43. Although an interbasin transfer out of the Great Lakes need not be interstate, the interests of
the basin states in keeping basin water in their jurisdictions to collect associated secondary benefits
could reasonably lead one to expect that unanimous consent under the Public Law will be more
readily granted to those interbasin transfers remaining within the riparian states than to those leaving
the basin states.
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they will affect water use and allocation. The holder of a permit is granted
the right to use the resource in specified ways while the granter or enforcer
of the permit can:
• set a standard for environmental quality;
" suspend, modify, grant or deny a permit (access);
" establish withdrawal rates (rate of use);
• require periodic reporting;
• require metering devices and water conservation;
• require a processing fee;
• determine priority of appropriation among users; and
• specify the duration of the permit."
A change in an existing property right system may be advocated for
various reasons. Generally in resource management, a change is sought
to reduce or modify an activity that generates an adverse externality.4 In
general, permits would limit entry and control use, thereby diminishing
the production of the undesired externality. In order for permits to be
effective, an acceptable environmental standard or quantity level must be
established. Once this desired standard or level is defined, the discrepancy
between the current and the desired standard becomes apparent and a
system is designed to close or prevent any deviance from the standard.
Essentially, the problem is dicotomized to: 1) specify the environmental
standard, and 2) create a system to meet the standard.' A permitting
system may be such a system.
Economists have long argued that setting an arbitrary standard will not
result in the optimal allocation of a resource.4 By association, permits
that are implemented to meet some environmental standard will not result
in an optimal allocation either. However, the Great Lakes states and
provinces have agreed through collective action to regulate water withdrawals by requiring water permits. The usual discussion of Pareto optimality, therefore, will not be revisited. Since a permitting system has
been chosen, the focus will be on finding the least-cost method of implementation.
Under traditional permit regulatory approaches, where each individual
permit is reviewed and specified on an individual basis by a regulating
agency, available empirical evidence suggests that the individual allo44. Maxwell & Waclti. Policies and Procedures Used for Granting Irrigation Permits in Selected
Upper Midwestern States 78-12. University of Minnesota Staff Paper 4 (1978).
45. Externalities involve an interdependence of utility or production functions where the utility
or production of an individual resource user is influenced by a variety of activities under the
individual's control and also by activities under the control of other resource users (noncompensated
interdependencies). C. Howe, Natural Resource Economics 241-255 (1979).
46. Tietenberg. TransferableDischarge Permits and the ControlofStationar. SourceAir Pollution:
A Survev and Synthesis, 56 Land Econ. 391, 395 (1980).
47. Baumol & Oates. The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment. 1971
Swedish J. Econ. 42, 43.
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cations are significantly more expensive than the possible minimum cost
allocation." For example, in the case of air pollution control there is no
evidence that the individual emission standards set by control authorities
achieve air pollution abatement goals in a least-cost manner."
On the other hand, a transferable permitting scheme, when unrestricted
trading is allowed, can achieve the least-cost implementation of an environmental standard.' A transferable permit establishes a property right
for the permit holder to consume a specific amount of the permitted
resource.5 ' Once the permit is granted, it can be transferred as property.
Depending on transaction restrictions, the transferable permit may be
bought, sold, rented, or leased. Examples of transferable permit markets
include Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) discharge permits, taxi cab
medallions, and liquor licensing. 2
Assuming a competitive market for permits, unrestricted transferability
results in the necessary first-order-conditions for the least cost solution
of attaining a chosen environmental quality standard." Hahn has also

shown that even where perfect markets for transferable permits do not
exist, lower management costs are attained than under a standard Command and Control (CAC) scheme." Transferability also creates the incentive to conserve the use of the permitted resource as its value increases
relative to other inputs. This results in a more efficient use of the resource
as an input and facilitates movement of the resource to higher valued
uses. As reallocation of the permits transpires, reductions in the amount
of resources committed to meeting the environmental standard occur."
Transferable permits are thus preferable over standard control permits
as the transferability of the permit leads to a least-cost solution for attaining an environmental quality standard. Evolution from a standard
CAC permit scheme to a transferable permit system represents a Pareto
improvement (a resource savings) in the allocation of the permitted resource..%
48. Titenberg, supra note 46, at 394.
49. Id. at 397.
50. R. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: Not Exactly What the Doctor
ordered 37 (1987) (mimeograph). (Robert W. Hahn was at Council of Economic Advisers. Executive
of the President. when he did the paper. It isan unpublished paper available from Hahn, Carnegie
Mellon University, Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania.) McGartland & Oates, Marketable Permits jar the
Preservation of Environmental Deterioration, 12 J.Env. Econ. & Mgmt. 207. 208 (1986).
51. Water permits should be defined as a consumptive use, not as a withdrawal, to facilitate the
determination of externalities associated with actual water loss. Johnson, Glisser & Werner. The
Definition of a Surface Water Right and TransferabiliM 24 J.Law & Econ. 273, 274 (1981). To
achieve water quality goals, discharge quality could be included in the permits.
52. Hahn. Designing Markets in Transferable Property Rights: A Practitioners Guide, in Buying
a Better Environment 83, 83 (E. Joeres & M. David eds. 1983).
53. McGartland & Oates, supra note 50, at 208.
54. Hahn. supra note 50, at 29.
55. McGartland & Oates. supra note 50. at 208: Tietenberg. supra note 46, at 399.
56. McGartland & Oates, supra note 50. at 208.
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Table 2. Charter Implementation: State Agency in Charge and Registration
and Permit Withdrawal Levels
Implementing Agency

States

Regulatory Instrument

Illinois

Illinois Department of
Transportation

Permit required for any sized
diversion and for any c.u.
2,000,000 gpd.

Minnesota

Minnesota Department
of Natural Resources

Permit for any water withdrawal
;- 10,000 gpd or o 100,000
gpy.

New York

New York Department
of Environmental
Conservation

Registration for any water
withdrawl ;- 100,000 gpd.
Permit for any c.u. _2,000.000 gpd. and a permit for
any sized water diversion

Ohio

Ohio Department of
Natural Resources

Registration for any water
withdrawal - 100,000 gpd.
Permit for any c.u. or diversion
a 2.000,000 gpd.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources

Registration for any water
withdrawal z '100,000 gpd.
Permit required for any c.u. or
diversion - 2.000.000 gpd.

Source: Personal interviews with State Water Policy Personnel.
c.u. - consumptive use
gpd - gallons per day
gpy - gallons per year

THE GREAT LAKE WATER PERMITS

The selection of the permit as the regulatory instrument for Great lakes
water quantity management should be no surprise. Both Minnesota and
Illinois employed CAC permits for Great Lakes water prior to the Great
Lakes Charter. Also, members of the regulating agencies (Department of
Natural Resources, or equivalent agencies) comprise, to a great extent,
the Water Resources Management Committee (WRMC) and were familiar
with permits based on other responsibilities within their agencies." ' The
success and performance of the permit systems in regulating basin-wide
water withdrawals will determine,- to a large extent, whether or not the
Great Lakes Charter management goals are attained. Table 2 summarizes
the withdrawal levels at which permits are required in the five states with
permit systems.
Permits in the five states allow each individual state to control the
aggregate level of withdrawals from its state waters. If all eight riparian
57. The designation of the DNR or equivalent agencies as the regulatory agencies instead of the
respective Departments of Commerce suggests a resource conservation orientation.
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states implement a permit system at the specified trigger levels, then via
the PNC process. the total aggregate level of withdrawals from the Great
Lakes Basin could be regulated to meet both conservation and development objectives for the states. That is, the Prior Notice and Consultation
(PNC) process could be used as a medium to cooperatively settle differences among states regarding water development and the desire to protect
the Great Lakes Basin from "adverse impacts on lake levels, in-basin
uses, and the Great Lakes Ecosystem. '
The current permits are standard CAC permits. Although Illinois permits are transferable following Illinois Department of Transportation approval, they not tradeable. All five state permit systems are somewhat
different. The Wisconsin permit system is used as an example. It is
employed because Wisconsin had no permitting system for surface water
withdrawals prior to the charter and the promulgated permit system best
represents the requirements suggested within the charter.
Wisconsin Act 60" sets forth the registration and regulation procedures
for permits that are enforced by the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (WDNR). The act closely follows the language of the charter.
The registration and permit requirements set forth in Act 60 are for surface
waters state wide.
A registration of any surface water withdrawal averaging more than
100,000 gpd in any 30 day period obligates the registrar to provide: the
source of withdrawal, the location ofdischarge, the location and nature
of the water use, the actual or estimated withdrawal quantities, and the
actual or estimated rates of water loss from the withdrawal.' The information provided in registration is not verified or cross-checked. 6
The application for a permit is required for any consumptive use greater
than 2 million gpd in any 30 day period. Documentation entails: current
operating capacity of the withdrawal system; place and source of withdrawal; location of discharge; location and nature of water use; average
rate of withdrawal; average rate of water loss; anticipated hydrologic
effects; total estimated construction costs; a list of all other needed approvals (permits, licenses, etc.); a statement of complicity with all plans
for the use, management, and protection of the state waters and related
land resources; a contingency plan in case of drought or other withdrawal
modifications; and a description of conservation practices.6 An applicant for a permit applies to the WDNR office, which then
follows state permit approval criteria (outlined below) to determine ac58. Task Force. supra note 3. at 6.
59. Wis. Stat. §§ 30.18-30.21. §§ 144.04-144.977 (1987-1988).
60. Id.§ 144.026.
61. Interview with Al Shea, Water Quantity Planner, Bureau of Water Resource Management,
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. Madison (June 8, 1987).
62. Wis. Stat. § 144.026.
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ceptability. A public review process exists within the approval process
and an appeal is allowed if the permit is denied. Upon approval, a permit
is issued specifying the location and amount of water use. Each permit
is individually reviewed and renewable on an annual basis. Externalities
associated with these- withdrawals that accrue outside of Wisconsin state
boundaries are not considered by WDNR during the approval process.
However, Wisconsin Act 60 does require WDNR to notify the office of
the Governor or Premiere and any agencies responsible for management
of water resources in each state and/or province in the event of a new
water loss to the Great Lakes Basin averaging more than 5 million gpd
in any 30 day period.' Again, the PNC process is not binding and
Wisconsin has final authority over the large scale consumptive use. When
determining whether or not to approve a permit, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) is not required to limit the aggregate
amount of permitted water consumption or diversion nor does the WDNR
have to consider total water availability in the Great Lakes relative to
existing permitted withdrawals. They or any other state permit granting
authority is not bound to consider externalities associated with basin water
withdrawals.
The charter agreement does not set limits on the number of permits
that can be issued nor on the total permitable quantity of water that is
potentially issuable by each state agency. Nor do the states/provinces

agree to a desired aggregate amount of water withdrawal from the Great
Lakes Basin, that is, no quantity level or any other environmental standard
is promulgated for the permits to enforce. Water withdrawal externalities
are not recognized by the current permits nor by the permit approval
mechanism. The PNC process is designed to address these issues, but it
is not binding. A permit issuing state will notify and consult with other

states by agreement or as legislatively required. However, given the
incongruent nature of conservation and development, the predisposition

of elected officials to promote their state's development, and their failure
to consider externalities explicitly within the permitting system, it will
be difficult to achieve conservation or prevent eventual overuse of the
resource with only the PNC process."
For example, Great Lakes water withdrawals lower lake levels which
may impose costs on navigation and hydropower interests in the Great
Lakes. Both interests prefer to maintain as high a range in lake levels as
is technically possible. At lower lake levels, ships are unable to transport
full cargo loads and hydropower plants are not able to operate at full
63. Id. § 144.0265b).
64. One may argue that the Public Law which requires unanimous gubernatorial approval should
mitigate this problem. at least for diversions. This may be true, since the unanimity certainly increases
prohibitively the political costs for a U.S. diversion. But, the law does not apply to consumptive
uses, which may be small in scale but in the aggregate could be formidable.
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capacity, resulting in increased unit costs in both cases. Currently, these
adverse interactions (externalities) are not considered by water withdrawers, nor is it realistic for each small scale withdrawer to do so. The
cumulative impacts of all withdrawals on lake levels, however, should
be a concern of Great Lakes water managers. A physical limit needs to
be recognized where significant economic impacts occur when additional
water is withdrawn if permits are to be effective.? The charter's espoused
management orientation and incorporation of the PNC process recognizes
this hydrologic/economic interaction but does not attempt to specifically
define it.
Another appealing aspect of the permit scheme is its potential to treat
each water withdrawal from any lake within each of the states equally.
If implemented, the permitting process would apply to everyone in the
state desiring to consume water in excess of the established trigger levels.
Also, managing the Great Lakes as a unified system dictates that appropriators filing for permits in Minnesota and in New York have equal
chances for approval, that is, all other things equal, the permit approval
process should be consistent across states.' Table 3 summarizes permit
approval criteria for the five states that legislatively meet the PNC requirements.
The approval criteria vary widely. How the agencies will interpret
"reasonable" and "consistent," for example, will vary between agency
and by state law. The only criteria that is common to all five states is
consistency with public health, safety, and welfare. This criteria is ar
direct outgrowth of the state's police power which is exercised to preclude
the creation of public harm. Given the varying criteria used by states and
the somewhat ambiguous language of the permits, one would not expect
the permit approval process to be consistent among states. Although the
discrepancies in the approval process may not be large, the differences
could undermine the current ethos of cooperation. If a state suspects
another of having "easy" approval criteria and, therefore, not contributing
adequately to the conservation goal, it might adjust its own criteria to
facilitate "easier" approval. In other words, it could foster negative expectations among states which could cause a breakdown of the permit
system.
To summarize, agencies sympathetic to the management goal of conservation have been designated as implementors/administrators of the
management rules in five Great Lakes states. The other three states have
thus far failed to legislatively implement the charter's rules. As imple65. A necessary condition for efficiency is that the value of water when diverted (or consumed)
out of the lakes is equal to the value of water as a stock (in the lake).
66. This may become critical under the even-handedness principle applied with the Sporhase
decision.

Summer 19901

INVTERBASIN TRANSFERS AND THE GREAT LAKES

Table 3. Permit Approval Standards
States
The Consumptive Use or
Diversion must:
I) Be of reasonable and beneficial use.
2) Incorporate reasonable conservation

ILL.

MN.

X
X

NY.

OH.

WI.

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

practices.

3) Be consistent with public health, safety
and welfare of the state.
4) Have legislative approval by majority vote.
5) Not conflict with future water resource
needs.
6) Enough available water must be in
proposed area.
7) Be consistent with State and other water
management plans.
8) Not conflict with competing users.
9) Not have a significant adverse impact on
the environment and ecosystem of the
Great Lakes.
10) Not adversely affect public water rights in
navigable waters.

X

X
X1
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

'For all c.u. and diversions a: 2,000.000 gpd except for those pertaining to domestic water supplies,
irrigation and agricultural processing.
Source: Personal Interviews of State Water Policy personnel and State documents.

mented, the current permits are inadequate for internalizing externalities
associated with water withdrawals in the Great Lakes. The reason lies
within the promulgated institutional arrangements of the Charter, as the

proposed system is not binding, and does not establish a maximum level
of aggregate withdrawals. In addition, the permit criteria adopted are not

completely consistent across the five states. The inconsistency may result
in negative expectations and undermine cooperation. These defects can
be attributed to the desire by states to retain their sovereignty in estab-

lishing permit systems and thus maintaining more flexibility for developing their state's economy.
Having recognized that the Great Lakes Basin must be managed as a
unified system, water quantity managers must now entertain the idea that

permits and permit approval criteria should be uniform across the basin.
A uniform regulatory instrument will meet the even-handedness principle
established by the Sporhase decision. Furthermore, any cooperative management of the Great Lakes must recognize and mitigate the externalities,

hydrologic and economic, associated with water withdrawals. As economic impacts accrue at some level of continued withdrawal, tradeoffs
must be recognized and managed. This implies that the hydrologic/economic lake level interaction must be well understood to assess tradeoffs
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between further development (in the form of water withdrawals) and
conservation of the Great Lakes' water resources. Until impacts of this
interaction are better known, at least in the case of consumptive uses,
conservation goals pursued within the Charter agreement will likely acquiesce to development goals pursued by individual entities who do not
consider externalities. For diversions, the reverse is likely to be true,
since the existing federal law is very restrictive concerning new Great
Lakes diversions.
The current role of the permits is relegated to gathering information
about withdrawals. If states/provinces simply desire to collect information, registration would accomplish this goal and would be more cost
effective. Since lake levels were high (1980-1986), the fact that permits
may not be consistent between states and do not internalize externalities
was not a big concern. But the Lakes are dynamic; lake levels fluctuate.
In fact, a significant drop in lake levels occurred in 1987 and 1988. The
ability to regulate by permit becomes important when lake levels recede
or withdrawals increase. As the regulatory role of permits increases, the
shortfalls inherent in their structure will become more important. If states/
provinces desire to manage the basin with respect to water withdrawals,
changes in the permits need to be considered. To this end, evolution
towards a transferable and divisible permit would be a positive next step.
TRANSFERABLE PERMITS
To be effective, cooperative management rules for water withdrawals
from the Great Lakes Basin need to recognize:
*
"
"
"

the hydrologic interdependencies;
the political, common property nature of the basin;
the historical state/province management of water resources;
the political significance attached to secondary benefits captured
by the states/provinces from entities consuming water within their
jurisdiction;
" the physical/economic interaction of the lake levels;
" the legal requirement for consistency and fairness among riparian
political entities and among riparian and non-riparian users;
" the need to internalize externalities associated with water withdrawals to prevent resource degradation and misallocation of resources.
The current permitting system as implemented in Illinois, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio and Wisconsin recognizes the first four of these points.
A transferable, divisible permit, if structured properly could accommodate
all seven points.
A transferable permit scheme for water withdrawals from the Great
Lakes requires the definition of a Minimum Lake Level (MLL). The MLL
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would represent the minimum desired physical hydrologic and economic
lake level. Creating a MLL standard would remove the ability to continue
to issue permits indefinitely since a maximum amount of water for withdrawals would be established.
The definition of a MLL must be an international decision for the Great
Lakes made by the eight states and two provinces. The critical component
of the MLL is the basis on which it would be defined, that is, what lake
level would be used to determine how much water to allocate for withdrawals under the transferable permit system.
For lake levels above the MLL, permits would be issued for the difference between the lake level and the MLL. Once the difference is
allocated, any entity desiring to withdraw water would have to buy, rent,
or lease permit shares from existing permit holders. Permits would not
have to be transferable within the entire basin; transferability within each
lake would suffice. For example, a permit issued for Lake Superior withdrawals might be transferable only within Lake Superior.
The permit could include a priority ranking, where the priority rank
could be based either on use, or time, or a combination of the two. When
lake levels drop below the MLL, the consumptive use right of the permit
would be proportionately reduced. The amount of reduction in the use
rate for each permit would depend on a relative priority ranking of the
permit and the amount that the lakes had fallen below the MLL. For
example, a permit issued in 1900 might have priority over a permit issued
in 1950, or a municipal use permit may have priority over an industrial
use permit. As lake levels fall below the MLL, the price of the permit
share would rise as the demand for the remaining water increases. As
lake levels rise, the price of a permit would fall and could approach zero
if the levels rose above the previous allocated difference between the lake
level and the MLL.
We do not attempt to define the MLL, but the following guidelines
should be considered. The decision will be hydrologic, economic, and
political. The MLL should be set based on the effects of withdrawals on
other activities in the basin such as navigation, hydropower, shoreline
property, and the basin's ecosystem. The decision should prevent degradation and overuse, that is, it should recognize the physical limits of
the Great Lakes and its ecosystem. Finally, the MLL need not be fixed
indefinitely once it is established, but should be flexible and reevaluated
periodically. For example, assume that the states and provinces decide
that the long term average lake level is the appropriate MLL. Suppose
that after a few years, the negative externalities caused by such a lake
level appear to be excessive. At this point, procedures must be in place
to allow a reevaluation of the MLL and to decide if and how it should
be changed.
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Since permits are transferable, they would have to be consistent among
states, particularly the criteria for approval. Indeed, a state or province
might have other states or provinces represented on the body approving
the states permit, for example, the Minnesota board approving Lake
Superior permits might include members from Ontario, Wisconsin, and
Michigan. All states and provinces at a minimum should agree on permit
approval criteria. Other permit decisions that need to be agreed upon in
an international context include: 1) the basis for defining permits, 2) the
procedures for allocating and exchanging permits, 3) the duration and
number of permits to be issued, 4) the restrictions on exchange, and 5)
the organizational arrangements for implementing the permit systems,
including who monitors and enforces compliance.'
The transferable permit can meet all Sporhase requirements for legislative management. Interstate commerce would not be an issue as the
permits allow transfers among states, and large scale transfers would be
difficult or impossible to get approved once aggregate limits are established for each lake and all surplus water is under permits. States could
maintain sovereignty over withdrawals by requiring approval over all
exchanges. Finally, the transferable permit facilitates a least cost solution
for management and allows freer movement of water resources to higher
value uses than is currently the case.
CONCLUSION
As population pressure and associated demands increase, unregulated
open access resources typically suffer from over-investment, over-exploitation, and eventual degradation. To correct this situation, institutional
arrangements need to be developed which facilitate either a "private" or
a "public" solution. The Great Lakes provide a good example of this
open access problem. Damages associated with water withdrawals from
the lakes are, generally, not accounted for by those withdrawing the water.
The Great Lakes Basin is an enormous, complexly integrated, interjurisdictional commons. With respect to consumptive water use, the basin
was essentially an open access resource prior to the promulgation of the
Great Lakes Charter and the Water Resources Management Act of 1986.
Changes in institutional arrangements and the Sporhaseand El Pasocourt
decisions, combined with changing socioeconomic conditions, forced
state political leaders to promulgate and implement rules to manage the
Great Lakes Basin with respect to water withdrawals.
Undoubtedly, the intent of political leaders from the basin states and
provinces is not to manage all withdrawals but only to protect the basin
67. Eheart. Brill & Lyon. Transferable Discharge Permits for Control of BOD: An Overview, in
Buying a Better Environment 163 (E. Joems & M. David eds. 1983).
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against unwanted interstate diversions. However, given the constraints
placed on legislative water management by the Sporhase and El Paso
court decisions, management rules have to be broadened to include all
withdrawals from the basin.
The Great Lakes Charter is a positive first step towards basin management. The political, common property nature of the Great Lakes is
recognized within the charter. All commons' members should be involved
in management decisions that significantly alter lake levels or water quality. The recognition by political leaders in the Great Lakes region that
the Great Lakes are an interdependent resource implies that it should be
managed as such. Management of an interdependent resource requires
management rules to be applied consistently to all users to develop expectations of reciprocity and assurance concerning the actions of others.
On this count, the Great Lakes Charter, as promulgated and implemented,
fails.
The implementation tool, the permit, is not consistent between or
among states. Approval criteria vary between states. Also, the permit
system as designed does not internalize externalities; permits do not take
into account lake level fluctuations. Because of the inherent goal conflicts
within the charter between conservation and development, no incentive
exists within the permit system or the prior notice and consultation process
for a state to discontinue issuing permits.
Because the charter recommends management by environmental standard (permits to enforce some standard) without setting the standard,
evolution towards a basin wide transferable permit system is recommended. Transferable permits that are uniform across the basin would
force an international, collective decision regarding an environmental or
lake level standard. They also would achieve the least-cost solution for
management while allowing free movement of water resources to higher
valued uses. The current permits are either too costly for simple data
collection or inadequate for basin wide management. Finally, given the
cooperative spirit that appears to exist among the states and provinces,
it is time for public officials in the Great Lakes to push for a consistent
system of transferable permits.

